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KISH ISLAND: FACT OR FICTION? 
From the palm-lined road nearby, the mountains of Iran's southern coast are 
visible. But any shadow cast by Iran's repressive regime barely seems to reach 
Kish's gentle sand. On this small island, 18 km off the southern coast of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, it is far easier to find a five-star hotel than a mosque. 
That's because Iran's dictatorial government is trying to showcase Kish not as a 
strict Islamic haven, but as an earthly paradise designed to win over the 
international community. 
(Roston, 2005, p. 21) 
Kish Island is one of three 'industrial free trade zones' approved by the Majlis (Iran's 
Islamic Consultative Assembly) in August 1993. Kish may be small: just 5 km wide 
and 17 km long. Still, it is administered semi-autonomously by 'an Authority 
organized as a company with autonomous legal status, whose capital shall belong to 
the government' (Law on Administration of Free Trade-Industrial Zones, Article 5). 
Its very smallness and islandness lets Kish get away with such a departure from 
fundamentalist theocratic rule. 
Many readers can be excused for thinking that the above example is a purely 
fictional one. For how could the most puritanical, hard-line and anti-Western of 
contemporary states - the Iran of the mullahs and the ayatollahs, member of 'the axis 
of evil' widely believed to be developing a nuclear arsenal - tolerate shopping malls, 
hyper-markets, theme parks, women in high heels and pool tables on part of its 
territory, an island which runs its own (semi-private) airline and has plans for an 
18-hole PGA golf course and a Formula One race track (Roston, 2005; Watson, 
2004)? 
Yet Kish Island is very real and its modus vivendi is not hard to understand. Iran, 
like other states, is keen to attract international capital: hence, the conversion to a 
visa-free trade zone and booming business hub. Kish's insignificant, remote and 
peripheral island status provides a tolerable and convenient diversion from the 
required austere life of the mainland. Here, Iran can profitably experiment with a 
site that is small and bounded, with no danger of destabilizing spillovers. Kish 
serves as an informal market for an international trade in avionics where Iran's air 
force fleet of ageing US-made F-15s, F-5s and F-4s (bought during the reign of the 
Shah), now under a US embargo, can access desperately needed maintenance parts 
and expertise. 
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MAINLAND-ISLAND RELATIONS 
This 'Mainland Iran-Kish Island' dialectic is not unique. There are many similar 
examples of 'mainland-island relations' in the contemporary world which, from a 
surface glance, do not seem to make sense. Yet their logic becomes clearer when seen 
in the context of states requiring unique offshore spaces outside the strait-jacket of the 
increasingly restrictive, 'level playing field' rules of global commerce among sovereign 
states. Islands then provide bounded space for the emergence of ingenious new species 
of asymmetrical economies and governance. 
The pattern repeats itself again and again where states make creative use of their 
small, far-flung and remote island jurisdictions to facilitate activities that would be 
simply anathema on home ground. Take Batam Island, located close to Singapore, 
that acts as the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia (Royle, 1997). Or consider 
Labuan Island, an integrated international offshore finance centre for neighbouring 
Malaysia (e.g. Fields, 2002). The Maldives, with its small population and 
convenient archipelagic geography, is another fundamentalist Islamic state that 
tolerates a vibrant tourism industry via a scrupulous zoning policy (Baldacchino, 
2004a). 
Even developed metropolitan powers play the same game, if in a somewhat more 
cynical fashion. The United Kingdom, for example, appeals for curbing low/no-tax 
regimes via the OECD and the G7, while encouraging British investment to benefit 
from the very same low/no-tax regimes of the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, 
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, for whose 'good government' the same United 
Kingdom remains ultimately responsible. Though a self-professed unitary state, China 
treats Hong Kong (since 1997) and Macao (since 1999) as 'special administrative 
regions', where 'the socialist system and policies shall not be practised ... and the 
previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years' 
(Ministry of Justice, People's Republic of China). Kinmen Island for its part acts as a 
relatively safe clearinghouse for China-Taiwan relations: particularly appreciated at 
times of tension (Hung-Ta, 2004). 
The rationale for these metropolitan-island arrangements, however, is scarcely 
one-sided. From the perspective of small island territories, there are quite plausible 
reasons to aspire to an 'arm's-length' relationship with a larger, 'mainland' 
benevolent patron. McElroy and Mahoney (2000) explain how the smaller players 
in these unequal dyads derive substantial economic advantages from the arrangement. 
These include: free or concessionary trade with, and export preference from, the 
parent country; social welfare assistance; ready access to external capital through 
special tax concessions; availability of external labour markets through migration; 
aid-financed infrastructure and communications; higher-quality health and educa-
tional systems; natural disaster relief; and provision for costly external defence. 
Autonomy without sovereignty may also facilitate tourism development because of 
easier terms of access and security. 
Most of these special conditions have emerged in the context of a history of a 
relatively benign colonial relationship - typically one dominated by strategic rather 
than economically exploitative interests. The Economist (2003) has claimed that the 
island citizens of Aruba, Bermuda and French Polynesia are amongst the world's top 
ten richest peoples: these three territories are non-sovereign island jurisdictions, 
benefiting from customized linkages with the much larger states of the Netherlands, 
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the United Kingdom and France respectively. Various other sub-national island 
jurisdictions partake of some form of profitable asymmetrical federalism with(in) a 
typically larger state (Stevens, 1977; Baldacchino, 2004b). 
Of course, it is important to recognize that the arrangements for many of the 
islands cited above vary enormously in nature and character. Typically, those like 
Kish Island - which have been constructed from above for profit or strategic 
convenience - lack the elements of genuine jurisdictional autonomy and historic 
entitlement that arise in many enduring island federacy arrangements. Kish Island 
cannot presume, for example, to claim a distinct status akin to the Isle of Man or the 
Aland Islands; these are 'autonomies' of a totally different order and character. The 
Isle of Man draws upon centuries of convention and practice to fortify its distinct 
constitutional status as a separate crown dependency from the UK mainland, while 
the Aland Islands have enjoyed international protection for its autonomy since 1920. 
Moreover, since there is often so little sociological or ideological substance or drive in 
Kish and other such island autonomies created from above, these do not exhibit 
anything like the claims to distinct 'nation' status that may arise in autonomies like 
the Faeroe Islands (e.g. Ackren, 2006), or even a struggling and constitutionally 
constrained Corsica (e.g. Lauwers, 2003). 
It is when the conditions of island identity are strong, and when there are powerful 
constitutional precedents to sustain the claim to self-rule, that island autonomies truly 
come into their own as partners in a genuine bilateral federal covenant. 
Constitutional arrangements here are truly 'federal', that is, contractual, the products 
of free consent between the parties, and not merely autonomies that are devolved 
from a central government and can be taken away as quickly as they were inti ally 
granted (Elazar, 1987, pp. 5-12). Such vigorous examples of federal 'self-rule' and 
'shared-rule' arrangements between islands and their metropoles are set out below in 
all their luxuriant variety. Most are a continuing testament to the rich governance 
systems, with all of their anomalies and asymmetry, that remain with the European 
retraction of Empire. Moreover, these delicate arrangements between European 
metropoles and their maritime dependencies have in turn been absorbed and 
'grandfathered' at the supranational level within the European Union. 
In their vast majority, then, these examples from the world's sub-national (mainly 
island) jurisdictions show a remarkable pattern of mutual accommodation and 
convenience between large (often metropolitan) states and their offshore islands. It is 
usually in the interests of neither party to push these islands into straightforward 
sovereignty, as was so often the case in the decades following the Second World War. 
Now, both prefer a negotiated bilateral partnership that can take its place within the 
highly variegated 'federal' landscape of governance within the modern world. Of 
course, there may also be in the metropolitan state an evident embarrassment over 
these remnants of empire and the continuing burden that they may present, so well 
reflected in the Netherlands' ongoing tug-of-war with its Caribbean island 
dependencies, or of New Zealand with its Pacific equivalents (see Oostindie and 
Connell, Chapters 9 and 11 respectively, this volume) So, the patterns and 
motivations on each side for current non-sovereign constitutional arrangements are 
complex and do not always move in the same direction or remain constant from one 
case to the next. 
In any event, we have to confront the fact that the contemporary global political 
and legal geometry is more complex than it has ever been and obliges us to rethink 
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older notions of sovereignty and the international state system. Upholding and 
distinguishing strict 'sovereign' from 'non-sovereign' entities in international practice 
was never consistently followed in the past and is even less tenable today, as power is 
increasingly pooled among and across states, and reconfigured and redistributed from 
within national territories. This practical spirit increasingly animates the arrange-
ments of many offshore islands with their metropolitan partners, where non-
sovereign island jurisdictions will wish to preserve, or even enhance, their 
asymmetrical status and autonomous powers, rather than take the risk of joining 
the ranks of sovereign states themselves. In short, life in the 'antechamber' of the state 
system (see Bartmann, Chapter 5, this volume) may look a good deal more attractive 
to these jurisdictions than the romantic advocates of sovereign self-determination had 
ever supposed. 
Such a position, of course, looks timid and self-defeating from the perspective of 
those who grew up in the heady days of colonial emancipation following the Second 
World War; but it is no longer so. Opting for non-sovereign jurisdictional status may 
be a highly rational, strategic choice that can result in substantial net material and 
security gains for the jurisdiction. As Oostindie's Chapter (9) in this collection so ably 
demonstrates, these judgements should not be lightly or ideologically dismissed, 
particularly at a time when security concerns are real and when sovereignty for most 
islands has largely not delivered relatively high levels of economic prosperity. The 
grant of sub-national island jurisdictional status (SNI]) typically confers a solid safety 
net supported by a metropolitan power, while permitting enough discretion to 
safeguard national identity, local culture and the general exercise of local power. 
McElroy and Pearce (Chapter 4, this volume) refer to a 'superior level of 
performance' by SNIJs. The metropolitan player can meanwhile exercise 'soft 
imperialism' (which does not typically raise eyebrows amongst the members of the 
UN Committee on Decolonization), keep a watchful eye for potential geo-strategic 
military or economic rents, and lavish its munificence upon its small island 
beneficiaries. 
Within this framework, islands may therefore be wise to ignore the siren call of 
sovereignty and cut their arrangements more pragmatically and creatively. Such a 
pragmatism manifests itself clearly, for example, in the muddy and treacherous 
waters of para-diplomacy (see Kelman et aI., Chapter 6, this volume). Of course, 
there are many circumstances where sovereignty will show itself to be the most 
logical or compelling course of action: such would explain the independence of 
East\rquote Timor in 2002 and of Montenegro in 2006, and Kosovo in 2008 (e.g. 
Bahcheli et aI., 2004). And there are many examples where (often small) island 
sovereign states have succeeded beyond all expectations and where the tools of 
sovereignty have been a vital part of the explanation for their success. A good case 
study would be Iceland; but, even here, as Kristinsson (2000) argues, the continued 
utility of undiminished sovereignty, together with non-membership of the European 
Union, will depend on circumstances. Surely, this is the point: the appropriate 
political architecture and jursidictional status for any island can only be known 
after careful review of all its current and likely future options undertaken in a 
clearsighted pragmatic spirit (e.g. Le Rendu, 2004). And, certainly for our purposes 
here, there appears to be every reason to expect islands in that kind of review to 
continue to opt for contoured, negotiated, non-sovereign, constitutional arrange-
ments in the future (e.g. Dodds, 2002). 
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AN 'ISLAND STUDIES' HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
We now move to a panoramic vantage point from which to observe and to 
understand how small islands - as parts of larger, multi-layered systems - have 
adapted and sustained themselves historically and how they now address current 
pressures of globalization and environmental threats. Indeed, sub-national island 
autonomies span all oceanic basins and boast all manner of diversities of size, climate, 
topography, ecology, history, economy, politics and jurisdiction (see the map on 
page xvii). 
These islands are the rich breeding grounds for unique adaptations of governance in 
the modern world, just as surely as islands have provided, ever since the days of 
Darwin and his contemporaries, bounded territories for study of biological and 
ecological systems in nature. A case study of an island such as Tasmania (see 
Stratford, Chapter 7, this volume) can sensitively explore some of these dimensions 
and properties of islandness - isolation and distinctiveness - as island 'resources'. As 
the work of comparative federal scholar Ronald Watts (Chapter 3, this volume) so 
powerfully illustrates, islands are an excellent lens through which to understand 
unique variations in federal governance arrangements. Watts' taxonomy of islands 
borrows its language and ideas about island federal relationships from evolutionary 
biology with its talk of variations or 'species' within a genus of self- and shared-rule 
arrangements. Watts arranges many de jure islands into various constitutional 
groupings, while avoiding problematic cases (like the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus). The evidence also shows two kinds of physical determinism: (1) a high 
logistical inclination for islands to enjoy some powers of self-rule, with different kinds 
of shared-rule arrangements with metropolitan states; and (2) a tendency for islands 
to be run as single jurisdictions, as if there were something abhorrent about splitting 
that which nature had defined as unitary (e.g. Baldacchino, 2002). 
In fact, while there are some 30,000 islands with a land area larger than 0.1 km2 
(Dahl and Depraetere, 2007, pp. 60-61), only nine (at most) today are split between 
two or more different countries (Baldacchino, 2006, p. 854). Small island territories 
have been 'decolonizing without disengaging' (Houbert, 1986), particularly since 
the\rquote 1940s, starting with the departmentalization of four French overseas 
island territories in 1946; followed by the setting up of the Netherlands Antilles in 
1954, and dramatized by the secession of Anguilla from St Kitts-Nevis in 1979. 
Historical practice and/or international provisions have secured over time the 
autonomy of such locations as Aland, Svalbard, the Channel Islands and the Isle of 
Man. Military interventions and/or sectarian strife has led to de facto autonomous 
jurisdictions in Northern Cyprus, Mindanao, Sri Lanka and Taiwan (though the latter 
is somewhat unique in being recognized by a number of states). Constitutionally or 
legally entrenched provisions secure and frame the autonomy of island provinces like 
Hawai'i, Mwali, Prince Edward Island and Tasmania. First nations enjoy self-
determination in locations such as Nunavut, Haida Gwaii/Queen Charlotte Islands, 
Rotuma and the Torres Strait. There are the various former colonies, not interested in 
independence (as stubbornly confirmed in various plebiscites), and engaged in 
evolving binary relations with Amsterdam, Copenhagen, London, Paris, Sydney, 
Washington or Wellington. Specific sub-national arrangements treat Kish, Labuan, 
Madeira, Corsica, Sicily, Nevis, Scotland and Zanzibar differently from the rest of 
their nation-state, often in respect of cultural differences and distinct histories, or as 
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an outcome of deliberate, central government strategy. There are also special island 
(or mainly island) regions which enjoy a specific autonomy portfolio, de jure or de 
facto: Hong Kong, Macao, Shetland and Sakhalin - thanks to a recognition of the 
prudent management of resourcefulness (investment finance, human capital, fossil 
fuels) that may be threatened in the loss of autonomy. The Galapagos Islands, 
featured in this collection, are another example of distinct autonomy arrangements, 
this time aimed at preserving an island's unique ecosystem and its legendary place as 
Darwin's laboratory for pioneering evolutionary thought (see Kerr, Chapter 10, this 
volume). 
ISLANDS IN FLUX 
Of course, the relationship of most 'island-mainland' dyads is far from smooth or 
settled. Asymmetrical federalism is by definition in perpetual negotiation: in 2005, 
Jeju Island become a 'special administrative province' of South Korea, enjoying even 
more autonomous powers (Chosun Ilbo, 2005); and the Bermuda Independence 
Commission visited London for high-level talks (Sanders, 2005). In 2006, Aland -
now with its own top-level internet domain (.ax) - threatened to scuttle the renewed 
attempt to get the European Constitution endorsed (Rennie, 2006); Tokelau rejected 
a move to independence in free association with New Zealand following a 
referendum (see Connell, Chapter 11, this volume); while China and Taiwan 
continued their - so far verbal and diplomatic - confrontation. Also in 2006, the UK 
High Court ruled that the Chagossians were entitled to return to the Chagos 
Archipelago; the UK government's subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Court of 
Appeal in May 2007 (http://www.chagossupport.org.ukl).Alsoin2007.Saint 
Barthelemy and Saint Martin became distinct collectivites d'outre mer as part of the 
latest reforms to the French overseas territories. Then, in 2008, the Netherlands 
Antilles break up: Bonaire, Saba and St Eustatius becoming muncipalities of the 
Netherlands; while Curas:ao and Sint Martin join Aruba, each in status aparte within 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
The fluidity of the 'mainland-island' arrangement is enhanced precisely because it 
is both federal (and thus involving multi-level governance, which presents 
competing claims for legitimacy and policy competence) and asymmetrical (where 
the striking of idiosyncratic or special deals and outcomes is often preferred). The 
relationship is liable to change (e.g., in Canada, see IIGR, 2005); and 'full 
sovereignty' (whatever that phrase may imply in the twenty-first century) remains a 
viable option and vision, should it be impossible to work out decent terms for a 
sub-national solution. We could scarcely find a better example of this critical fluid 
nature of governance than that of Bougainville (see Ghai and Regan, Chapter 8, this 
volume) with the recent changing nature of that island's status towards autonomy 
either within, or possible independence from, Papua New Guinea. The issue of re-
negotiation in these cases may be fractious: the terms of the relationship may be the 
subject of civil strife, guerrilla movements or other forms of internal warfare and 
diplomatic tension. This can take the guise of 'infra-nationalism' which is a political 
and institutional structure beyond the constitution, a de facto island (or sub-island) 
state apparatus existing in taunting defiance of the main state, with which relations 
are not harmonious - as has occurred in recent decades in such diverse places as 
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Aceh, Bougainville, Corsica, Cyprus, New Caledonia, Mindanao and Sri Lanka 
(Weiler, 1991). 
This state of variability is often represented in an expression of ambivalent, 'love-
hate' nationalism. The smaller (island) player is often demonstrably proud of its own 
(sub-?) national identity, captured also by explicitly showcased cultural differences (in 
language, religion, history, ethnic composition, political ideology and other identity 
symbols like flags, anthems, currency, monuments, emblems and top-level internet 
domains) from its larger player. Yet it may refer to a benign, special relationship with 
the larger player for the purpose of defending its prized autonomy and self-
determination (from the threat of international piracy, general insecurity or 
irredentist neighbouring states). If the relationship lies in discord, then local political 
movements and the public at large are likely to see, and play upon, the image of the 
larger player in a colonial or imperialist light, unfairly and insensitively pushing its 
weight around, and frustrating their legitimate rights to self-determination. The larger 
player, in contrast, would tend to react (if at all) by invoking obligations towards 
order and regional stability and against renegade, destabilizing and quirky politics. 
The situation 'on the ground' is usually far more complex, with different political 
parties, social classes and other social groupings on the island, on the mainland and in 
between (the influential island diaspora) championing and expressing their preference 
for one or more of what could be a bewildering range of relational solutions (e.g., for 
the Caribbean, see Ramos and Rivera, 2001, pp. 1-21). We capture something of 
these intricate dynamics in this volume's study of two island archipelagos linked to 
South American states, the Galapagos Islands in relation to Ecuador, and the 
Caribbean islands of San Andres and Old Providence in relation to Colombia (see 
Kerr, Chapter 10, this volume). 
These case studies illustrate how contingent and varied are the experiences of many 
island communities as they seek to navigate towards more autonomous patterns of 
governance and economy within a bilateral arrangement with a mainland state. The 
patterns can vary sharply from case to case in response to the particular circumstances 
of the geography and history of islands. In some cases, islands like San Andres and 
Old Providence have been consigned to a near fief-like condition; others, like the 
Galapagos Islands, to a slightly more elevated status, and yet others have navigated 
far more independently. There is much variability and contingency too in the patterns 
of island economies. This has presented a very serious challenge to thinkers in the field 
who have begun to do comparative study and reflection on these different patterns 
and to generate typologies of island governance and economy that\rquote warrant 
further study (e.g. Warrington and Milne, 2007; Bertram and Poirine, 2007). 
CONCLUSION 
Back in the mid-1980s, riding a significant wave of reflection triggered by the 1983 US-
led invasion of Grenada, the overriding issue of debate was security for those islands 
still enamoured of decolonization (e.g. Alford, 1984; Commonwealth Consultative 
Group, 1985; Diggines, 1985; Harden, 1985; Lyon, 1985). There was no 'small is 
beautiful' rhetoric here, but, rather, dark talk of extreme vulnerability - even non-
viability - for such small island states. Their economies were often dim is sed in a 
similarly scathing manner. In a journal editorial, the raison d'etre for small states and 
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the motley 'left-overs' of empire was reduced half-humorously to: 'casino countries, tax 
havens, sheep stations, bauxite plants, air bases, tourist traps, oilwells with surrounds, 
banana plantations and nutmeg groves' (Editorial, The Round Table, 1984, p. 124). 
This colourful representation was even then an unfair and incorrect characterization, 
and it has become increasingly so. Almost as an act of vengeance, many small sub-
national island jurisdictions now show enviable per capita levels of prosperity, even 
higher than those for small sovereign island states (Armstrong et aI., 1998; Armstrong 
and Read, 2002; Bertram, 2004; Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Poirine, 1998). 
To be sure, islands can still be used and valued principally for strategic 
metropolitan purposes. Japan, for example, maintains its only large and contentious 
US military base on the outlying island prefecture of Okinawa, recently the subject of 
a resiting agreement (Kakazu, 2000). Britain summarily deported the entire island 
population of the Chagos Archipelago and leased the islands to the USA, which in 
turn built the ultra-sophisticated Indian Ocean military base at Diego Garcia 
(Winchester, 2004). Of course, the USA meets another strategic purpose in the 
questionable practice of detaining suspected terrorists in 'legal limbo' on its island 
base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba (Supreme Court of the United States, 2004; 
Greenhouse, 2008). The Australian government 'excised' Christmas Island, Cocos 
(Keeling) Islands and the Ashmore Reef from the nation's territory for the purposes of 
immigration, deeming that persons who had arrived there had not effectively entered 
the country (Connell, 2006, p. 55). 
But this unflattering portrait of sub-national islands as weak and subordinate 
containers purely at the mercy of outside metropolitan powers is scarcely the norm in 
this new age of globalization and multi-level governance. Island jurisdictions 
customarily defy that caricature, whether as fully fledged states or increasingly as 
sub-national actors working out their own pragmatic responses to the challenges of a 
changing global system in concert with their partners. Of course, the patterns vary 
enormously, as do the constitutional choices and options. Sovereignty is still a 
powerful dream for many peoples, whether living on islands or not, and in many 
circumstances it may be the best of all options. But we also now live in a world where 
there is less certainty about the merits of sovereignty than was once the case, and less 
arrogance about the ultimate choices that island jurisdictions ought to take. We 
welcome this more pragmatic and tolerant spirit respecting constitutional arrange-
ments, along with the confidence and flexibility it engenders among island peoples 
worldwide. Now islands can get on with making their choices, and crafting their 
futures with less fear and ridicule than in the past. 
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